



Copyright © 2017, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. All rights reserved.

2017 Edition

Modification of Judgments in Family Matters

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

Table of Contents

Introduction	3
Section 1: Modification of Alimony	4
Section 2: Modification of Child Support	13
Table 1: Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703 (1991)	23
Section 2a: Factors Used in Child Support Modification	24
Section 3: Modification of Child Custody	29
Section 4: Modification of Child Visitation	34
Table 2: Request for Leave may be appended to Motion to Modify	39

*Prepared by Connecticut Judicial Branch, Superior Court Operations,
Judge Support Services, Law Library Services Unit*

lawlibrarians@jud.ct.gov

These guides are provided with the understanding that they represent only a beginning to research. It is the responsibility of the person doing legal research to come to his or her own conclusions about the authoritativeness, reliability, validity, and currency of any resource cited in this research guide.

View our other research guides at
<http://www.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/selfguides.htm>

This guide links to advance release slip opinions on the Connecticut Judicial Branch website and to case law hosted on Google Scholar.
The online versions are for informational purposes only.

Related Research Guides:

Alimony in Connecticut	Dissolution of Marriages
Best Interest of the Child Standard in Connecticut	Enforcement of Family and Foreign Matrimonial Judgments
Child Custody in Connecticut	Equitable Distribution of Marital Property in Connecticut
Child Support in Connecticut	Motion to Open in Family Matters
Child Visitation in Connecticut	Pleadings and Motion Practice in Family Matters
Discovery (Financial) in Family Matters	Premarital (Antenuptial) and Postnuptial Agreements in Connecticut

Connecticut Judicial Branch Website Policies and Disclaimers
<http://www.jud.ct.gov/policies.htm>

Introduction

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

- **Modification:** “is “[a] change; an alteration or amendment which introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter intact”” [Rosato v. Rosato](#), 40 Conn. App. 533, 535-536, 671 A.2d 838 (1996).
- **Modification of support:** “any final order for the periodic payment of permanent alimony or support or an order for alimony or support pendente lite may at any time thereafter be continued, set aside, altered or modified by said court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party or upon a showing that the final order for child support substantially deviates from the child support guidelines” Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-86](#)(a) (2017).
- “...alimony typically is modifiable, while disposition of marital property are not.” [Dombrowski v. Noyes-Dombrowski](#), 273 Conn. 127, 133, 869 A.2d 164 (2005).
- **Modification:** “means a child custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes or is otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the prior custody determination.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-115a](#)(11) (2017).
- **Modification of child custody and visitation standard:** “In making or modifying any order as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests.” Conn. Gen. Stats. § [46b-56](#)(b) (2017).
- “In ruling on a motion to modify visitation, the court is not required to find as a threshold matter that a change in circumstances has occurred. *Szczerkowski v. Karmelowicz*, 60 Conn.App. 429, 433, 759 A.2d 1050 (2000); see also *McGinty v. McGinty*, 66 Conn.App. 35, 40, 783 A.2d 1170 (2001). Instead, “[i]n modifying an order concerning visitation, the trial court shall “be guided by the best interests of the child....” General Statutes § 46b-56 (b).” *Kelly v. Kelly*, 54 Conn.App. 50, 57, 732 A.2d 808 (1999);” [Balaska v. Balaska](#), 130 Conn. App. 510, 515-16, 25 A.3d 680, 684 (2011).

Section 1: Modification of Alimony

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE: Bibliographic resources relating to the grounds and procedures for modifying alimony in Connecticut.

- DEFINITION:**
- **Cohabitation:** "Section 46b-86 (b), known as the 'cohabitation statute,' provides in pertinent part that a court may 'modify such judgment and suspend, reduce or terminate the payment of periodic alimony upon a showing that the party receiving the periodic alimony is living with another person under circumstances which the court finds should result in the modification . . . of alimony because the living arrangements cause such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of that party.'" [D'Ascanio v. D'Ascanio](#), 237 Conn. 481, 485-486, 678 A.2d 469 (1996).
 - **Substantial change in circumstances:** "When presented with a motion for modification, a court must first determine whether there has been a substantial change in the financial circumstances of one or both of the parties Second, if the court finds a substantial change in circumstances, it may properly consider the motion and, on the basis of the § 46b-82 criteria, make an order for modification The court has the authority to issue a modification only if it conforms the order to the distinct and definite changes in the circumstances of the parties." [Crowley v. Crowley](#), 46 Conn. App. 87, 92, 699 A.2d 1029 (1997).
 - "When determining whether there is a substantial change in circumstances, the court is limited in its consideration to conditions arising subsequent to the entry of the dissolution decree." [Spencer v. Spencer](#), 71 Conn. App. 475, 481, 802 A.2d 215 (2002).
 - **Decree or order of the court:** "Thus, even if the parties had agreed that the defendant would not be obligated to comply with the alimony order, that agreement would not be effective to modify the defendant's obligation because, as previously stated, '[d]ecrees in a dissolution action cannot be modified by acts of the parties without further decree or order by the court.' *Albrecht v. Albrecht*, 19 Conn. App. 146, 151, 562 A.2d 528, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 813, 565 A.2d 534 (1989)." [Ford v. Ford](#), 72 Conn. App. 137, 141, 804 A.2d 215 (2002).

STATUTES:

You can visit your local law library or search the most recent [statutes](#) and [public acts](#) on the Connecticut General Assembly website.

- Conn. Gen. Stat. (2017)
[§ 46b-86](#). Modification of alimony or support orders and judgments.

COURT RULES:

Amendments to the Practice Book (Court Rules) are published in the [Connecticut Law Journal](#) and posted [online](#).

- Connecticut Practice Book (2017)
 - [Chapter 25](#) Superior Court—Procedure in family matters
 - § 25-24(b) "...Each such motion shall state clearly, in the caption of the motion, whether it is a pendente lite or a post judgment motion."
 - § 25-26. Modification of custody, alimony or support
 - § 25-30. Statements to be filed

FORMS:

- [Filing a Motion for Modification - Connecticut Judicial Branch](#)
- Manamara, Welsh, and George, editors. [Library of Connecticut Family Law Forms](#) (2d ed. 2014)
 - 5-038 Motion for Modification of Unallocated Alimony and Support (Pendente Lite)
 - 16-000 Commentary – Post Judgment Pleadings, p. 542
 - 16-005 Motion for Modification of Unallocated Alimony and Support (with OTSC papers)
- Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 8 [Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law And Practice with Forms](#) (3d ed. 2010).
 - § 35.31 Motion for modification of alimony—Form
 - § 35.32 Motion for modification of alimony based on cohabitation—Form

CASES:

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

- [Ceddia v. Ceddia](#), 164 Conn. App. 266, 274, 137 A.3d 830, 834 (2016). **"When the parties wished to preclude one aspect of possible periodic alimony modification, they knew how to do so. Their marital dissolution agreement specifically stated that the alimony was nonmodifiable as to duration. However, the parties were silent as to any similar restriction on any later modifications as to the *amount* of periodic alimony. That omission leads us to the conclusion that it was not barred by the marital dissolution agreement or the judgment of dissolution that incorporated the agreement's terms. We therefore reject this waiver claim."**
- [Dan v. Dan](#), 315 Conn. 1, 11-15, 105 A.3d 118 (2014). "There is little, if any, legal or logical support, however, for the proposition that a legitimate purpose of alimony is to allow the supported spouse's standard of living to match the supporting spouse's standard of living after the divorce, when the supported spouse is no longer contributing to the supporting spouse's income earning efforts. Rather, the weight of authority is to the contrary. We are persuaded by the reasoning of these cases, namely, that, when the amount of the original alimony award was and continues to be sufficient to fulfill the purpose of the award, whether that purpose was to maintain permanently the standard of living of the supported spouse at the level that he or she enjoyed during the marriage or to provide temporary support in order to allow the supported spouse to become self-sufficient, an increase in the income of the supporting spouse, standing alone, is not a sufficient justification to modify an alimony award. In short, when the

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

sole change in circumstances is an increase in the income of the supporting spouse, and when the initial award was and continues to be sufficient to fulfill the intended purpose of that award, we can conceive of no reason why the supported spouse, whose marriage to the supporting spouse has ended and who no longer contributes anything to the supporting spouse's income earning efforts, should be entitled to share in an improved standard of living that is solely the result of the **supporting spouse's efforts."**

- [Lynch v. Lynch](#), 153 Conn. App. 208, 211, 100 A.3d 968 (2014). **"The plaintiff specifically claims that the court improperly (1) awarded alimony to the defendant, Laurie Lynch, and not to him; (2) denied his request for equitable financial relief in his motion for modification, even though he had met his burden of establishing a substantial change in circumstances; (3) granted the defendant's October 11, 2012 motion for contempt; (4) granted the defendant's May 1, 2013 postjudgment motion for contempt; (5) calculated the reimbursement for stipulated shared household expenses owed to him by the defendant; (6) failed to calculate a pendente lite arrearage owed to him by the defendant; (7) awarded \$7500 in appellate attorney's fees to the defendant; (8) entered financial orders that were inequitable to him and that demonstrated the court's bias against him; and (9) failed to hear certain of his motions and denied others without consideration of his due process rights. We disagree with all nine of the plaintiff's claims and affirm the judgment of the trial court."**
- [Brown v. Brown](#), 148 Conn. App. 13, 14, 84 A.3d 905 (2014). **"On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly determined that it was in the best interests of the parties' minor child to relocate to Canada to reside primarily with the defendant, (2) abused its discretion in its award of alimony to the defendant and improperly calculated the amount of child support that he was required to pay under the child support guidelines, (3) abused its discretion in limiting the circumstances under which he could seek modification of his alimony obligation, and (4) improperly ordered the parties to file a joint tax return for the 2011 tax year. We reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to its order to file a joint tax return and affirm the judgment in all other respects."**
- [Olson v. Mohammadu](#), 310 Conn. 665, 666, 81 A.3d 215 (2013). **"...a court that is confronted with a motion for modification under § 46b-86 (a) must first determine whether the moving party has established a substantial change in circumstances, and in making that threshold determination, if a party's voluntary action gave rise to the substantial change in circumstances warranting modification, the court must assess the motivations underlying the voluntary conduct to determine whether there is culpable conduct foreclosing the threshold determination of a substantial change in circumstances, and, if**

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

- the court finds such a substantial change in circumstances, the **court may determine what modification, if any, is appropriate.**"
- [Von Kohorn v. Von Kohorn](#), 132 Conn. App. 709, 716, 33 A.3d 809 (2011). "The court, by granting the plaintiff's request for clarification, lacked the authority to alter the substantive terms of the prior judgment beyond those terms that it determined were omitted from the original order. See *Mickey v. Mickey*, supra, 292 Conn. at 604–605, 974 A.2d 641. It also lacked any authority to make substantive changes pursuant to General Statutes § 52–212a or Practice Book §§ 17–4 and 11–11 because the court did not grant reargument of the terms of the alimony orders, and the court reasonably could not have treated the plaintiff's post-judgment motion as a motion to open the judgment and modify the alimony award because such relief was neither directly nor implicitly requested in the postjudgment motion."
 - [Lehan v. Lehan](#), 118 Conn. App. 685, 696, 985 A.2d 378 (2010). "For purposes of § 46b-86(b), the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's financial needs, as quantified by the court in setting the alimony award pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-82, have been altered by her living arrangements. See *id.*, at 324, 951 A.2d 587. 'Although the alteration need not be substantial ... the difference must be measurable in some way before the court can conclude whether a difference, in fact, exists.... In other words, the court must have the ability to compare the [defendant's] financial needs at different points in time in order to determine whether those needs either **have increased or have decreased over time.**'"
 - [Taylor v. Taylor](#), 117 Conn. App. 229, 232-233, 978 A.2d 538 (2009) "The defendant claims that because the agreement failed to include language that after the events mentioned, alimony would be subject to a de novo review, the second look should be based on a substantial change of circumstances. See, e.g., *Borkowski v. Borkowski*, 228 Conn. 729, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994)....The agreement, however, specifically provides that on the happening of either of the two previously mentioned events, alimony may be given a second look. We conclude, therefore, that this language permits a de novo review of the plaintiff's alimony obligation."
 - [Ucci v. Ucci](#), 114 Conn. App. 256, 261, 969 A.2d 217 (2009). "Although the defendant's motion for modification included the language of the modification provision of the separation agreement, as well as the substantial circumstances language of the statute, the defendant did not alert the court at any time that he sought modification pursuant to the agreement only and that the court could not consider the statutory criteria of § 46b-82."

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

- [Simms v. Simms](#), 283 Conn. 494, 502-503, 927 A.2d 894 (2007). “[Section] 46b-86 governs the modification or termination of an alimony or support order after the date of a dissolution judgment. When, as in this case, the disputed issue is alimony, the applicable provision of the statute is § 46b-86 (a), which provides that a final order for alimony may be modified by the trial court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party. . . . Under that statutory provision, the party seeking the modification bears the burden of demonstrating that such a change has occurred. . . . Because a request for termination of alimony is, in effect, a request for a modification, this court has treated as identical motions to modify and motions to terminate brought under § 46b-86 (a). . . .” [*Borkowski v. Borkowski*, 228 Conn. 729, 734-735 (1994).]
- [Doody v. Doody](#), No. FA 02-0731061 (Conn. Super. Ct., Hartford J.D., May 17, 2005). “However, a defendant's inability to pay ‘does not automatically entitle a party to a decrease of an alimony order.’ *Sanchione v. Sanchione* 173 Conn. 397 (1977). Such inability to pay must be excusable and not brought about by the defendant's own fault before a motion for modification may be granted. *Wanatowitz v. Wanatowitz*. 12 Conn.App. 616 (1987); *Gleason v. Gleason*, 16 Conn.App. 134 (1988); *Talbot v. Talbot*, 148 Conn. App. 279 (2014).
- [Simms v. Simms](#), 89 Conn. App. 158, 162 (2005). “The defendant's claim that the self-executing alimony alterations constitute modifications of the dissolution orders is untenable. Those alterations were required not by a subsequent court order or adjudication by the court, but rather by the express terms of the settlement agreement incorporated into the 1979 dissolution orders. This court has held that ‘[d]ecrees in a dissolution action cannot be modified by acts of the parties without further decree or order by the court.’ *Albrecht v. Albrecht*, 19 Conn. App. 146, 151, 562 A.2d 528, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 813, 565 A.2d 534 (1989). The record reveals no further decree or order by the court since 1979.”
- [Gay v. Gay](#), 266 Conn. 641, 647-648, 835 A.2d 1 (2003). “[T]he purpose of both periodic and lump sum alimony is to provide continuing support.’ *Smith v. Smith*, 249 Conn. 265, 275, 752 A.2d 1023(1999). At least where, as is generally the case, **capital gains** do not represent a steady stream of revenue, the fact that a party has enjoyed such gains in a particular year does not provide a court with an adequate basis for assessing that party's long-term financial needs or resources. For this reason, we conclude that capital gains are not income for purposes of modification of an order for continuing financial support if those gains do not constitute a steady stream of revenue. This is true without regard to whether the assets from which those gains are derived were acquired before or after the dissolution. There is nothing in the

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

record to suggest that the plaintiff can, through the ongoing sale of capital assets, maintain the income stream found by the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude that, regardless of when the capital assets sold by the plaintiff were acquired, the gains on the assets were not income.” (Emphasis added).

- [Distefano v. Distefano](#), 67 Conn. App. 628, 633, 787 A.2d 675 (2002). “In accordance with General Statutes § 46b-86 (b) and the holding in *DeMaria*, before the payment of alimony can be modified or terminated, two requirements must be established. First, it must be shown that the party receiving the alimony is cohabitating with another individual. If it is proven that there is cohabitation, the party seeking to alter the terms of the alimony payments must then establish that the recipient’s financial needs have been altered as a result of the **cohabitation.**”
- [Clark v. Clark](#), 66 Conn. App. 657, 665, 785 A.2d 1162 (2001). “The court is not required, however, to consider all of the § 46b-82 criteria when modification of alimony is sought pursuant to a dissolution agreement.”
- [Grosso v. Grosso](#), 59 Conn. App. 628, 634, 758 A.2d 367 (2000). “In the present case, however, the defendant moved to modify the alimony payments pursuant to § 46-86 (a). The court fashioned a remedy for the defendant’s changed circumstances in a way contemplated by subsection (a). Accordingly, we find that the court acted properly and did not abuse its discretion in **suspending the alimony payments.**” (Emphasis added).
- [Way v. Way](#), 60 Conn. App. 189, 194, 758 A.2d 884 (2000). “When a decree contains language precluding modification, a trial court, under its continuing jurisdiction, has the power to determine whether the preclusive language in the decree should be enforced.”
- [DeMaria v. DeMaria](#), 247 Conn. 715, 720, 724 A.2d 1088 (1999). “Because, however, ‘living with another’ person without financial benefit did not establish sufficient reason to refashion an award of alimony under General Statutes § 46b-81, the legislature imposed the additional requirement that the party making alimony payments prove that the living arrangement has resulted in a change in circumstances that alters the financial needs of the alimony recipient. Therefore, this additional requirement, in effect, serves as a limitation. Pursuant to § 46b-86 (b), the nonmarital union must be one with attendant financial consequences before the trial court may alter an award of alimony.”
- [Crowley v. Crowley](#), 46 Conn. App. 87, 699 A.2d 1029 (1997). **Interest on modified retroactive alimony orders.**

- [Borkowski v. Borkowski](#), 228 Conn. 729, 736, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994). “In general the same sorts of [criteria] are relevant in deciding whether the decree may be modified as are relevant in making the initial award of alimony. They have chiefly to do with the needs and financial resources of the parties.’ . . . More specifically, these criteria, outlined in General Statutes 46b-82, require the court to consider the needs and financial resources of each of the parties and their children, as well as such factors as the causes for the dissolution of the marriage and the age, health, station, occupation, employability and amount and sources of income of the parties.”
- [Dooley v. Dooley](#), 32 Conn. App. 863, 632 A.2d 712 (1993). “Alimony pendente lite may not be modified unless there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the date of the award.”
- [Scoville v. Scoville](#), 179 Conn. 277, 279, 426 A.2d 271 (1979). “Lump sum alimony, unlike periodic alimony, is a final judgment which cannot be modified even should there be a substantial change in circumstances”

DIGESTS:

- West Key Numbers: *Divorce*
V. Spousal support, allowances and distribution of property
C. Spousal support #558-649
#618-635 Modification of judgment or decree
- Dowling’s Digest: *Dissolution of marriage* §19
- Connecticut Family Law Citations:
Alimony—Judgments, Orders, and Decrees—Modification
Alimony—nonmodifiable
Alimony—permanent

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

- 24A [Am. Jur. 2d](#) *Divorce and Separation* (2008).
§§ 718-758. Modification of alimony awards
- 27B [C.J.S.](#) *Divorce* (2005).
§§ 638-665. Modification or vacation of allowance
§§ 786-796. Proceedings for modification or vacation of order or decree
- James Lockhart, *Cause Of Action To Obtain Increase In Amount Or Duration Of Alimony Based On Changed Financial Circumstances Of Parties*, 19 COA 1 (1989).
- Beth Bates Holliday, *Cause Of Action For Modification Of Amount Of Permanent Alimony Based On Changed Financial Circumstances Of Party Making Payment*, 38 COA 73 (2008).
- *Modification Of Spousal Support Award*, 32 POF2d 491(1982).
§§ 12-20. Proof of supported spouse’s right to increased support
§§ 21-27. Proof of supporting spouse’s right to decrease or terminate support
- *Modification Of Spousal Support On Ground Of Supported Spouse’s Cohabitation*, 6 POF3d 765 (1989).
§ 17. Checklist—Proving cohabitation
§§ 18-19. Model interrogatories

§§ 20-45. Proof of cohabitation as basis of support modification

TEXTS & TREATISES:

You can click on the links provided to see which law libraries own the title you are interested in, or visit our [catalog](#) directly to search for more treatises.

- Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 8 [Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law And Practice with Forms](#) (3d ed. 2010).
 - Chapter 35. Modification of Alimony Provisions
 - § 35.2 Necessity of changed circumstances
 - § 35.3 Modifiability of lump sum award
 - § 35.4 Modification where no alimony is originally granted or reserved
 - § 35.5 Modification to change duration of alimony award
 - § 35.6 Effect of provisions limiting or prohibiting modification
 - § 35.7 Effect of modification on accrued alimony
 - § 35.10 Facts justifying modification
 - § 35.11 Inadequacy of original order
 - § 35.12 Changes in health of the parties
 - § 35.13 Child's increased earnings, expenses or needs
 - § 35.14 Changes in custody or child support
 - § 35.15 Increases in cost of living
 - § 35.16 Changes in earnings or assets of the payor
 - § 35.17 Changes in earnings or assets of the payee
 - § 35.18 Loss of employment
 - § 35.19 Effects of general business conditions
 - § 35.20 Rehabilitation after divorce
 - § 35.21 Remarriage of payor
 - § 35.22 Remarriage of payee
 - § 35.23 Misconduct of the party receiving alimony
 - § 35.24 Criteria to be considered for modification
 - § 35.25 Modification of alimony based upon cohabitation
 - § 35.26 Proof of cohabitation
 - § 35.27 Relief available based upon cohabitation
 - § 35.28 Burden of proof and notice requirement
 - § 35.29 Modification and appeal distinguished
 - § 35.30 Effect of Child Support Guidelines
- Barbara Kahn Stark, [Friendly Divorce Guidebook for Connecticut: Planning, Negotiating and Filing Your Divorce](#) (Revised and updated 2003).
 - Chapter 11. Alimony.
 - Reduction and Modification, p. 293
- Louise Truax, Editor, [LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law](#) (2016)
 - Chapter 5. Alimony
 - Part V: Seeking a Modification of Alimony Orders
 - § 5.29 CHECKLIST: Seeking a Modification of Alimony Orders
 - § 5.30 Analyzing statutory provisions for modification
 - § 5.31 Construing provisions prohibiting or limiting modification

§ 5.32 Determining the underlying alimony order to be modified

§ 5.33 Proving a substantial change in circumstances

§ 5.34 Determining criteria to be considered for a modified award

§ 5.35 Preparing a Motion for Modification

§ 5.36 Seeking a retroactive modification

§ 5.37 Interpreting "Second Look" provisions

§ 5.38 Modifying alimony based upon the cohabitation of the recipient

- [Connecticut Lawyer's Deskbook: A Reference Manual](#) (3d ed. 2008)

Chapter 19. Dissolution of Marriage.

pp. 487-488

- Ralph Dupont, 2 [Dupont on Connecticut Civil Practice](#) (2008) §§ 25-26 to 25-26.4.

- Barry F. Armata et al., Editor, [A Practical Guide to Divorce in Connecticut](#) (2014).

Chapter 6. Alimony

§ 6.13 Alimony Modification

§ 6.14 Consideration of Property in Alimony Modification

§ 6.16 Second Look

LAW REVIEWS:

- Cynthia George, *Combating The Effects Of Inflation On Alimony And Child Support Orders*, 75 Connecticut Bar Journal 223 (1983).

Section 2: Modification of Child Support

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to modification of support including grounds but excluding IV-D child support cases.

DEFINITIONS:

- **Modification of child support:** "any final order for the periodic payment of permanent alimony or support or an order for alimony or support pendente lite may at any time thereafter be continued, set aside, altered or modified by said court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party or upon a showing that the final order for child support substantially deviates from the **child support guidelines**" Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-86](#) (a) (2017).
- "...a party seeking a modification must show that the continuation of the prior order would be unfair or inequitable." [Robinson v. Robinson](#), 172 Conn. App. 393, 403, 160 A.3d 376 (2017).

STATUTES:

You can visit your local law library or search the most recent [statutes](#) and [public acts](#) on the Connecticut General Assembly website to confirm that you are using the most up-to-date statutes.

- Conn. Gen. Stat. (2017)
 - § [46b-86](#). Modification of alimony or support orders and judgments
 - (a) [*Substantial change in circumstances or deviation from child support guidelines as grounds for modification*]
 - (c) [*When a motion to modify must be filed with the Family Support Magistrate Division*]
 - § [46b-215e](#). Initial or modified support order where child support obligor is institutionalized or incarcerated.
 - § [46b-224](#). Effect of court order changing or transferring guardianship or custody of child on preexisting support order.

[Chapter 817](#). Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (§§ 46b-301-46b-425)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

- P.A. 90-188. An act concerning use of guidelines for modification of support orders
House Bill No. 5668 (1990)
Senate proceedings: 2702-2705, 2754-2755
House Proceedings: 3624-3628
Hearings, Judiciary Committee: 411-412, 415-416, 421-428, 475, 502-503, 512, 553-554, 556, 589-591, 619-620, 621, 628

REGULATIONS:

- Conn. Agencies Regs. (3/7/2015)
Title IV-D Program
§ [17b-179\(m\)-8](#). Review and modification

COURT RULES:

Amendments to the Practice Book (Court Rules) are published in the Connecticut Law Journal and posted [online](#).

FORMS:

Official Judicial Branch forms are frequently updated. Please visit the [Official Court Webforms page](#) for the current forms.

CASES:

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

- [Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines](#) (July 1, 2015)
- Connecticut Practice Book (2017)
 - [Chapter 25](#). Procedure in Family Matters
 - § 25-26. Modification of custody, alimony or support
 - § 25-30. Statements to be filed
 - § 25-57. Affidavit concerning children
- **Official Forms**
 - [Filing a Motion for Modification](#)
 - [JD-FM-174](#). Motion for Modification (Rev. 2/13)
 - [JD-FM-174H](#). Motion for Modification Help Text (Rev. 2/13)
 - [JD-FM-202](#). Request for Leave (Rev. 8/07)
- Amy Calvo MacNamara, Aidan R. Welsh, and Cynthia Coulter George, Editors, [Library of Connecticut Family Law Forms](#) 2d (2014).
 - 16-005 Motion for Modification of Unallocated Alimony and Support
 - 16-009 Modification Agreement
- [Gabriel v. Gabriel](#), 324 Conn. 324, 332 (2016).

“Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that ‘the financial circumstances of the parties have changed as a result of the defendant’s relocation. [The defendant] no longer has primary residential custody of the children and is no longer primarily responsible for their financial needs. The [plaintiff] now has custody and primary responsibility for all three minor children.’ Both the trial court and the Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiff’s filing of the motion for modification triggered § 46b-224. *Gabriel v. Gabriel*, supra, 159 Conn.App. at 820-21, 123 A.3d 453. We agree.”

“[I]n order to address the plaintiff’s motion for modification, it was necessary for the trial court to know how much of the original award of unallocated alimony and support was attributed to child support. Because the court that issued the original support order did not make such a finding, the trial court was required to make that determination before ruling on the motion for modification. . . . On remand, the trial court should conduct a hearing to determine, based on evidence presented by the parties, the specific amount of child support required at the time the defendant had primary physical custody of the parties’ children.” p.340
- [McKeon v. Lennon](#), 321 Conn. 323, 336, 138 A.3d 242 (2016). **“We therefore conclude, in light of the different purposes of alimony and child support, that the Appellate**

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

Court improperly relied on *Dan* in determining that 'both alimony and child support orders are subject to the same modification requirements under § 46b-86 (a)'; *McKeon v. Lennon*, supra, 155 Conn. App. at 434, 109 A.3d 986; and that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff was required to show additional circumstances, beyond the increase in the defendant's income, to justify modification of the child support award."

- [Olson v. Mohamradu](#), 169 Conn. App. 243, 248, 149 A. 3d 198 (2016). "The Supreme Court held that 'the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the defendant's voluntary relocation and income change necessarily precluded him from establishing a substantial change in circumstances.' *Olson v. Mohamradu*, supra, 310 Conn. at 670-71, 81 A.3d 215. The court reasoned as follows: '[T]he trial court should have taken into account the defendant's motivation for relocating in deciding the threshold issue of whether there was a substantial change of circumstances warranting modification. In other words ... the trial court should have determined whether the defendant's alleged inability to pay was a result of his own extravagance, neglect, misconduct or other unacceptable reason Because the trial court made no finding on the culpability of the defendant's conduct, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly applied the law when it denied the defendant's motion for modification.'"
- [Malpeso v. Malpeso](#), 165 Conn. App. 151, 176-177, 138 A.3d 1069 (2016). "Section 46b-86 (a) provides in relevant part: 'No order for periodic payment of permanent alimony or support may be subject to retroactive modification, except that the court may order modification with respect to any period during which there is a *pending motion for modification of an alimony or support order from the date of service of notice of such pending motion upon the opposing party....*' (Emphasis added.) Therefore, notwithstanding the general rule that in Connecticut, absent an agreement, a parent's obligation to support a child ends at the age of majority, the party seeking to terminate such obligation must file a motion with the court."
- [Farmassony v. Farmassony](#), 164 Conn. App. 665, 672-673, 138 A.3d 417 (2016). "The child support award, as defined in the child support and arrearage guidelines, § 46b-215a-1 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, and in the parties' separation agreement, includes child care costs. Thus, the entirety of the order of child support, including its provisions for the payment of child care costs, is part of the order for support. Therefore, § 46b-86 (a) bars any retroactive modification of the order of child care costs because it is an integral part of the overall order of

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

support. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court for retroactive repayment of the child care costs.”

- Vincent v. Vincent, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, No. FBT-FA12-4041710-S (April 26, 2016) (2016 WL 2891285) (2016 Conn. Super. LEXIS 399). **“There are a number of cases in which a motion for modification of support has been denied, despite a substantial change in circumstances, when the moving party's culpable conduct formed the sole basis of the substantial change in circumstances. In *Sanchione v. Sanchione*, 173 Conn. 397, 407, 378 A.2d 522 (1977), the court held that culpable conduct precludes a threshold showing of a substantial change in circumstances. ‘Nearly every human action is voluntary, but not every voluntary action is fault worthy. The words used by this court in *Sanchione*-“fault . . . extravagance, neglect, misconduct or other unacceptable reason”-underscore that the crux of the inquiry is culpability and not voluntariness. ‘. . . The rationale [sic] in *Sanchione* was recently affirmed in *Olson*. The court held that if: ‘a party's voluntary action gives rise to the alleged substantial change in circumstances warranting modification, the court must assess the motivations underlying the voluntary conduct in order to determine whether there is culpable conduct foreclosing a threshold determination of a substantial change in circumstances.’ *Olson at 684.*”**
- Collin v. Collin, Superior Court, Judicial District of Windham at Putnam, No. WWM-FA10-4010129-S (February 4, 2016) (61 Conn. L. Rptr. 798, 800) (2016 WL 888066) (2016 Conn. Super. LEXIS 332). **“In determining the question on appeal as to whether the children's social security dependency benefits, which are independent of the defendant's social security disability payments, should be used to pay the defendant's child support order including any arrearage that accrued between June 2012 and December 2014, the cases of *Jenkins v. Jenkins*, 243 Conn. 584, 704 A.2d 231(1998) and *Tarbox v. Tarbox*, 84 Conn.App. 403, 853 A.2d 614 (2004), are instructive.”**

“our appellate courts have not provided authority for this court to conclude that the defendant is entitled to use the children's dependency benefits as a credit or reimbursement against her arrearage. Our appellate court cases, however, have said that the amount of children's dependency benefits should be included in the gross income of the noncustodial parent as earnings of the contributing parent for purposes of determining the amount of that parent's child support obligation under the guidelines. In addition, our courts have stated that the noncustodial parent should file a motion for modification of the child support obligation reflecting a change in financial

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

circumstances, a procedure consistent with § 46b-86(a).” p. 802

- [Coury v. Coury](#), 161 Conn. App. 271, 294-295, 128 A.3d 517 (2015). “The defendant's child support obligation to the plaintiff was suspended by operation of law pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-224 when the court transferred sole physical custody of the parties' three minor children to him. Extending *Shedrick* to the facts of this case, and prohibiting the court from retroactively modifying the child support portion of the unallocated support award would conflict with § 46b-224, which requires modification of a child support order, or the child support portion of an unallocated support order, from the moment that a court transfers custody of minor children from a recipient of child support to a payor of child support. See *Tomlinson v. Tomlinson*, 305 Conn. 539, 552, 557, 46 A.3d 112 (2012) (noting that § 46b-224 operates to require modification of child support order and holding that child support portion of unallocated support order was modifiable despite provision in parties' separation agreement prohibiting modification).”
- [Fulton v. Fulton](#), 156 Conn. App. 739, 749 (2015). “The parties and the court are entitled to rely on the financial affidavits submitted at the time of the dissolution, which are presumed to be reliable for that purpose. If, however, a party makes a preliminary showing that an affidavit submitted at the time of the dissolution was inaccurate, that the error was not intentional or misleading to the court or another party, and that it would thus be inequitable to rely only on the mistaken information, a postdissolution court may consider factors other than the financial affidavit in deciding whether there has been a **substantial change of circumstances.**”
- [Fox v. Fox](#), 152 Conn. App. 611, 621, 99 A.3d 1206 (2014). “Thus, [w]hen presented with a motion for modification, a court must first determine whether there has been a substantial change in the financial circumstances of one or both of the parties.... Second, if the court finds a substantial change in circumstances, it may properly consider the motion and, on the basis of the § [46b-84] criteria, make an order for modification.... (Citations omitted; footnotes altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) *Olson v. Mohamradu*, 310 Conn. 665, 671-74, 81 A.3d 215 (2013).”
- [Olson v. Mohamradu](#), 310 Conn. 665, 684, 81 A.3d 215 (2013). “A court that is confronted with a motion for modification under § 46b-86(a) must first determine whether the moving party has established a substantial change in circumstances. In making this threshold

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

determination, if a party's voluntary action gives rise to the alleged substantial change in circumstances warranting modification, the court must assess the motivations underlying the voluntary conduct in order to determine whether there is **culpable** conduct foreclosing a threshold determination of a substantial change in circumstances. If the court finds a substantial change in circumstances, then the court may determine what modification, if any, is **appropriate in light of the changed circumstances.**"

- [Tanzman v. Meurer](#), 309 Conn. 105, 117-118, 70 A.3d 13 (2013). **"As the present case shows, the failure to specify the dollar amount of the earning capacity leaves the relevant party in doubt as to what is expected from him or her, and makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, both for a reviewing court to determine the reasonableness of the financial award and for the trial court in a subsequent proceeding on a motion for modification to determine whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances. We therefore conclude, pursuant to our inherent supervisory authority, that, when a trial court has based a financial award pursuant to § 46b-82 or § 46b-86 on a party's earning capacity, the court must determine the specific dollar amount of the party's earning capacity. We further conclude that, because the trial court in the present case could not reasonably have concluded that there had been no substantial change in the plaintiff's earning capacity between the time of the original financial award and the motion for modification without ever having determined the plaintiff's specific earning capacity, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion for modification. Finally, we conclude that the remedy when the trial court has indicated that it failed to determine the specific amount of a party's earning capacity at the time of the original financial award is for the trial court to conduct a new hearing on the issue."**
- [Tomlinson v. Tomlinson](#), 305 Conn. 539, 556, 46 A.3d 112 (2012). **"Although we recognize that it is fundamental that 'parties are free to contract for whatever terms on which they may agree,' and, accordingly, that '[w]hether provident or improvident, an agreement moved on calculated considerations is entitled to the sanction of the law'; (internal quotation marks omitted) *Crews v. Crews*, 295 Conn. 153, 169, 989 A.2d 1060 (2010); it is equally clear that contracts relating to the maintenance or custody of children 'will not be enforced longer than it appears to be for the best interests of the child, and parents entering into such a contract are presumed to do so in contemplation of their obligations under the law and the rights of the child.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Guille v. Guille*, supra, 196 Conn. at 264, 492 A.2d 175. Because the parties enter into a contract in contemplation**

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

of their obligations under the law, a contractual provision is ineffective to prohibit modification of child support when, as in the present case, there has been a change in custody.”

- [Shipman v. Roberts](#), 130 Conn. App. 332, 338-339 (2011). **“In the present case, the obligor is incarcerated** for the criminal offenses of manslaughter and risk of injury to a child: offenses against the child who was killed. The deceased child is not the subject of the support order nor is she the custodial party. Although we certainly agree with the minor child that the defendant’s conduct was traumatizing to the plaintiff and the minor child, they were not the victims of the criminal offenses for which the defendant is incarcerated. Thus, the court properly determined that § 46b-215e does not bar a modification of **the defendant’s child support obligation.**”
- [Cannon v. Cannon](#), 109 Conn. App. 844, 851, 953 A.2d 694 (2008). **“It is well within the law and the court’s** discretion to make the modification retroactive to the date that the motion for modification was served, which was July 9, 2003. See *Sabrowski v. Sabrowski*, 105 Conn. App. 49, 57, 935 A.2d 1037 (2007).”
- [Cervizzi v. Cervizzi](#), Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville, No. FA02-0079710S (August 29, 2007) (2007 WL 2597615) (2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2313). **“The husband claims that as the result of his** voluntarily retiring from his principle employment, there has been a substantial change in circumstances justifying a downward modification of his child support order For **the foregoing reasons, the motion to modify is denied.**”
- [Santoro v. Santoro](#), 70 Conn. App. 212, 218, 796 A.2d 567 (2002). **“In addition, a child support order cannot be** modified unless there is (1) a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party or (2) a showing that the final order for child support substantially deviates from the child support guidelines absent the **requisite findings.**”
- [Priol v. Priol](#), 67 Conn. App. 7, 12, 787 A.2d 50 (2001). **“The parties’ agreement to revisit the issues of alimony and** child support cannot contract away the statutory requirement that the party seeking modification demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances and excuse the failure to comply with the rules of practice with **respect to the filing of such a motion.**”
- [W. v. W.](#), 248 Conn. 487, 494, 728 A.2d 1076 (1999). **“Therefore, we conclude that regardless of whether the** child at issue in the present case is considered a ‘child of

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

the marriage,' the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to order pendente lite child support."

- [Turner v. Turner](#), 219 Conn. 703, 720, 595 A.2d 297 (1991). *Substantial deviation from the child support guidelines (added by P.A. 90-188) applies retroactively.* See [Table 2](#).
- [Brock v. Cavanaugh](#), 1 Conn. App. 138, 141, 468 A.2d 8 (1984). *Support payments are not conditioned upon visitation. "Furthermore, a support order can only be modified by the court."*
- [Hardisty v. Hardisty](#), 183 Conn. 253, 258-259, 439 A.2d 307 (1981). "Once a trial court determines that there has been a substantial change in the financial circumstances of one of the parties, the same criteria that determine an initial award of alimony and support are relevant to the question of modification."

WEST KEY NUMBER:

Child Support.

- VI. Modification, #230-364.
 - (A) In general, #230-235
 - (B) Particular factors and grounds, #236-307
 - 1. In general, #236-244
 - 2. Factors relating to obligors, #250-266
 - 3. Factors relating to custodian, #270-285
 - 4. Factors relating to child, #290-307
 - (C) Proceedings, #320-343
 - (D) Amount and incidents of award, #350-364

DIGESTS:

- Cynthia C. George and Amy Calvo MacNamara, [Connecticut Family Law Citations](#) (2016).
Chapter 10. Child Support
§ 10.07. Modification of child support
- [Family Support Magistrate Decisions](#) and Digest
II. Motion for modification
III. Substantial change of circumstances
- ALR Quick Index:
Custody and Support of Children. Change or Modification

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

- 24A [Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation](#) (2008)
§§ 998-1020.
§§ 1004-1010. Change in circumstances
§ 1005. Nature and sufficiency of change
- *Changes In Circumstances Justifying Modification Of Support Order*, 1 POF 2d 1 (1974).
 - o §§ 6-16. Proof of change in circumstances justifying increase in child support payments

**TEXTS &
TREATISES:**

You can click on the links provided to see which law libraries own the title you are interested in, or visit our [catalog](#) directly to search for more treatises.

- o §§17-29. Proof of change in circumstances justifying decrease in child support payments
- 8 Arnold H. Rutkin et al., [Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law And Practice with Forms](#) 3d (2010).
 - Chapter 37. Temporary Child Support
 - § 37:11 Modification
 - Chapter 39. Modification of child support provisions of judgment
 - § 39:2. Grounds for modification
 - § 39:3. Grounds for modification, deviation from the Child Support Guidelines
 - § 39:5. Timing of factors to be considered
 - § 39:6. Parties entitled to seek modification
 - § 39:9. Modifiability of support payments; limitations
 - § 39:10. Modification based on agreement of the parties
 - § 39:11. Automatic modification provisions
 - § 39:12. Modification where no order for support originally entered
 - § 39:13. Specific grounds for modification of support
 - § 39:14. Factors relating to visitation or custody
 - § 39:16. Remarriage of either parent
 - § 39:17. Death of either parent
 - § 39:18. Change in financial circumstances of either parent
 - § 39:19. Health of the children
 - § 39:20. Changes in cost of living
 - § 39:21. Earnings of the child
 - § 39:22. Effect of modifications on arrearages; retroactive changes
 - § 39:23. Effect of prior modification
- Louise Truax, Ed., [LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law](#) (2017).
 - Chapter 7. Child Support.
 - Part IX: Preparing Motions for Modification
- Marian F. Dobbs, [Determining Child and Spousal Support](#) (1995).
 - Chapter 6. Modification of Support
- 5 Arnold H. Rutkin et al., [Family Law and Practice](#) (2016).
 - § 52.03 Modification of Child Support
 - [3]. Grounds for modification
 - [4]. Defenses
 - [a]. Emancipation of Child
 - [b]. Frustration of Visitation
 - [c]. Termination of Parental Rights; Adoption

PAMPHLETS:

- Connecticut Network for Legal Aid.
[How To Change Your Child Support Order](#)

LAW REVIEWS:

Public access to law review databases is available on-site at each of our [law libraries](#).

- *Calculating And Collecting Child Support: Sixteen Years After The Guidelines...And Counting*, 23 [Family Advocate](#) no. 2 (Fall 2000).
—Alexander S. deWitt, *Making Your Case For Modification*, p. 30.
- Cynthia George, *Combating The Effects Of Inflation On Alimony And Child Support Orders*, 75 [Connecticut Bar Journal](#) 223 (1983).

Table 1: Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703 (1991)

<p>Grounds for modification of alimony or support orders and judgments. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-86(a) (2017)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • substantial change in circumstances; or • substantial deviation from child support guidelines
<p>“Both the ‘substantial change of circumstances’ and the ‘substantial deviation from child support guidelines’ provision establish the authority of the trial court to modify existing child support orders to respond to changed economic conditions. The first allows the court to modify a support order when the financial circumstances of the individual parties have changed, regardless of their prior contemplation of such changes. The second allows the court to modify child support orders that were once deemed appropriate but no longer seem equitable in the light of changed social or economic circumstances in the society as a whole, as reflected in the mandatory periodic revisions of the child support guidelines. See General Statutes 46b-215a. In light of the similar purposes and language of these provisions, we conclude that the legislature intended both provisions to be applicable to orders entered before the provisions became law.” Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 718 (1991).</p>
<p>“In further support of our interpretation of the legislative intent underlying P.A. 90-188, we take judicial notice of a statutory development that occurred in the 1991 legislative session, a few months after the trial court rendered its judgment in this case. While the legislature was considering a bill that would establish a standard by which a court could determine what degree of deviation from the child support guidelines might be considered ‘substantial,’ an attorney for a legal services organization informed the Judiciary Committee that trial courts had construed P.A. 90-188 to preclude its retrospective application to orders entered before the effective date of the act. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, March 22, 1991, pp. 888-89, remarks of Amy Eppler-Epstein. [fn10] The legislature subsequently enacted Public Acts 1991, No. 91-76, 1 (P.A. 91-76), which added the following provisions to General Statutes 46b-86 immediately following the text that had been added by P.A. 90-188: ‘There shall be a rebuttable presumption that any deviation of less than fifteen percent from the child support guidelines is not substantial and any deviation of fifteen percent or more from the guidelines is substantial. Modification may be made of such support order without regard to whether the order was issued before, on or after the effective date of this act.’ This act was signed by the governor on May 9, 1991, and became effective on that date. See Public Acts 1991, No. 91-76, 7.” Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 718-719 (1991).</p>
<p>“The magistrate concluded, nevertheless, that the express statement of retroactivity added by the 1990 amendment was intended to apply only to the ‘substantial change of circumstances’ provision of 46b-86. We conclude, to the contrary, that these amendments, which were enacted in the same legislative session to enhance the ability of parties to modify support orders, must be construed to create one consistent body of law.” Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 718 (1991).</p>

Section 2a: Factors Used in Child Support Modification

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to the factors used by the courts in determining and modifying child support.

DEFINITIONS:

- **Earning capacity:** “is an amount which a person can realistically be expected to earn considering such things as his vocational skills, employability, age and health.” [Weinstein v. Weinstein](#), 280 Conn. 764, 772, 911 A.2d 1077 (2007).
- “The guidelines define **gross income** as the “average weekly earned and unearned income from *all sources* before deductions....” (Emphasis added.) Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 (11). Gross income includes, inter alia: “salary ... commissions, bonuses and tips ... [and] profit sharing, deferred compensation and severance pay....” Id., § 46b-215a-1 (11)(A)(i), (iii)-(iv). **Net income** is defined as “gross income minus allowable deductions.” Id., § 46b-215a-1 (17).” [Hendricks v. Haydu](#), 160 Conn. App. 103, 112-113, 124 A.3d 554 (2015).
- **Supplemental order** “... to pay a percentage of a future lump sum payment, such as a bonus. Such supplemental orders may be entered only when: (i) such payment is of an indeterminate amount; and (ii) the percentage is generally consistent with the [guidelines] schedule....” Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2b (c)(1)(B).” [Hendricks v. Haydu](#), 160 Conn. App. 103, 112-113, 124 A.3d 554 (2015).

STATUTES:

You can visit your local law library or search the most recent [statutes](#) and [public acts](#) on the Connecticut General Assembly website.

- Conn. Gen. Stat. (2017).
 - § [46b-84](#)(d). Parents' obligation for maintenance of minor child. Order for health insurance coverage.
 - § [46b-215b](#)(c). Guidelines to be used in determination of amount of support and payment on arrearages and past-due support.
 - § [46b-215e](#). Initial or modified support order where child support obligor is institutionalized or incarcerated.

REGULATIONS:

- [Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines](#) (July 1, 2015)

CASES:

- [Robinson v. Robinson](#), 172 Conn. App. 393, 397-98, 160 A.3d 376 (2017). “Section 46b-215a-1(11) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies defines gross income as the average weekly earned and unearned income from all sources before deductions That section includes a nonexhaustive list of twenty-two inclusions. In that list of inclusions is: ‘alimony being paid by an individual *who is not a party to the support determination.*’ (Emphasis added.)

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1(11)(A)(xix). The specific wording of this inclusion makes clear that only alimony received from a nonparty to the support **determination is included in gross income.**" [Internal quotation marks omitted.]

- [Valentine v. Valentine](#), 164 Conn. App. 354, 368-369, 141 A.3d 884 (2016). "In the present case, the court had before it the parties' financial affidavits, reflecting their net incomes, and it specifically stated that it had considered the 'amount and sources of income,' and had taken 'into account the net income of the parties' in fashioning periodic alimony and child support orders. The court further indicated that its award of \$300 per week in child support, retroactive to May 20, 2013, and reduced to \$215 per week as of the date the oldest child graduated from high school, June 27, 2014, was 'in accordance with the child support guidelines,' which would have required a consideration of the parties' net incomes. Although the court made passing references to the parties' gross incomes, it never stated that it was relying solely on their gross incomes. Facially, the court's consideration of alimony and child support included evidence of the parties' net incomes. The court was not required to make explicit findings as to net income. See *Hughes v. Hughes*, 95 Conn. App. 200, 207-208, 895 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 902, 907 A.2d 90 (2006)."

- [Mingo v. Blake](#), Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford, No. HHD-FA15-4077658-S (January 22, 2016) (61 Conn. L. Rptr. 714, 715) (2016 WL 572028) (2016 Conn. Super. LEXIS 149). "General Statutes § 46b-215e governs a court's authority to impose a current child support order upon an incarcerated obligor. Although § 46b-215e does not explicitly define the phrase 'substantial assets,' the statute indicates that 'an initial order for current support [shall be] ... based upon the obligor's ... substantial assets, if any, *in accordance with the child support guidelines* established pursuant to section 46b-215a.' (Emphasis added.) Thus, the plain language of the governing statute directs a court to consider the child support guidelines when imposing a current order of child support upon an incarcerated obligor."

"The court concludes that the pending personal injury claim of the defendant was properly considered an asset by the FSM. And while the claim was unliquidated and the precise value undetermined at the time of the hearing, there was ample evidence from which he could properly conclude that the asset was 'substantial.'" p. 716

- [Hendricks v. Haydu](#), 160 Conn. App. 103, 112-113, 124 A.3d 554 (2015). "The guidelines also permit courts, in appropriate cases, to enter 'a supplemental order ... to pay a

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

percentage of a future lump sum payment, such as a bonus. Such supplemental orders may be entered only when: (i) such payment is of an indeterminate amount; and (ii) the percentage is generally consistent with the [guidelines] **schedule....' Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2b (c)(1)(B). 'A supplemental order treats the unknown future lump sum payment separately from the basic current support order and is intended to account only for those instances in which the parties have knowledge of an anticipated future lump sum payment of an unknown amount, such as a bonus.'** (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Gentile v. Carneiro*, 107 Conn.App. 630, 643, 946 A.2d 871 (2008). However, our Supreme Court has stated that it broadly interprets the 'definition of gross income contained in the guidelines to include items that, in effect, increase the amount of a parent's income that is *available for child support purposes.*' (Emphasis added.) *Unkelbach v. McNary*, supra, 244 Conn. at 360, 710 A.2d 717; see also *Tuckman v. Tuckman*, 308 Conn. 194, 213-14, 61 A.3d 449 (2013) (remanding 'the ... case for a determination of what portion of the defendant's income was available income for purposes of fashioning ... child support orders').

- [Tanzman v. Meurer](#), 309 Conn. 105, 113-114, 70 A.3d 13 (2013). "It is well established that the trial court may under appropriate circumstances in a marital dissolution proceeding base financial awards [pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46b-82 (a) 3 and 46b-86] on the earning capacity of the parties rather than on actual earned income. *Lucy v. Lucy*, 183 Conn. 230, 234, 439 A.2d 302 (1981). Earning capacity, in this context, is not an amount which a person can theoretically earn, nor is it confined to actual income, but rather it is an amount which a person can realistically be expected to earn considering such things as **his vocational skills, employability, age and health.**' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Weinstein v. Weinstein*, 280 Conn. 764, 772, 911 A.2d 1077 (2007). 'When determining earning capacity, it ... is especially appropriate for the court to consider whether [a person] has wilfully restricted his [or her] **earning capacity to avoid support obligations.**' *Bleuer v. Bleuer*, 59 Conn.App. 167, 170, 755 A.2d 946 (2000)."
- [Maturro v. Maturro](#), 296 Conn. 80, 106, 995 A.2d 1 (2010). "...when there is a proven, routine consistency in annual bonus income, as when a bonus is based on an established percentage of a party's steady income, an additional award of child support that represents a percentage of the net cash bonus also may be appropriate if justified by the needs of the child. When there is a history of wildly fluctuating bonuses, however, or a reasonable expectation that future bonuses will vary substantially, as in the present case, an award based on a fixed percentage of the net cash bonus is impermissible unless it can be linked to the child's

characteristics and demonstrated needs.”

- [Auerbach v. Auerbach](#), 113 Conn. App. 318, 334-335, 966 A.2d 292 (2009). “It is well established that the trial court may under appropriate circumstances in a marital dissolution proceeding base financial awards on the earning capacity of the parties rather than on actual earned income.... Earning capacity, in this context, is not an amount which a person can theoretically earn, nor is it confined to actual income, but rather it is an amount which a person can realistically be expected to earn considering such things as his vocational **skills, employability, age and health....[I]t also is especially** appropriate for the court to consider whether the defendant has wilfully restricted his earning capacity to avoid support obligations.”
- [Battersby v. Battersby](#), 218 Conn. 467, 471-472, 590 A.2d 427 (1991) “The Guidelines themselves list several factors that may be relevant to the determination of support amount, including the ‘needs of a second or prior family’ and ‘other reasonable considerations.’ ”
- [Vickery v. Vickery](#), 25 Conn. App. 555, 562, 595 A.2d 905 (1991). “Finally, the defendant claims that it is impossible for the court to apply the mandates of 46b-84 and 46b-86 and apply the mandates of the guidelines at the same time. This claim is without merit.”

**FAMILY SUPPORT
MAGISTRATE
DECISIONS:**

- [Family Support Magistrate Decisions](#) are available through the Law Libraries’ website.

**WEST KEY
NUMBERS:**

Child Support.

III. Factors considered, #40-125.

(A) In general, #40-63

(B) Factors relating to custodians and obligors, #70-99

(C) Factors relating to child, #100-125

DIGESTS:

- Cynthia C. George and Amy Calvo MacNamara, [Connecticut Family Law Citations](#) (2017).
 - Chapter 10. Child Support
 - § 10.03. Child Support Guidelines
 - § 10.04. Additional factors to be considered
 - [1] Age of child
 - [2] Child care expenses
 - [3] Earning capacity
 - [4] Emancipation
 - [5] Health of child
 - [6] Incarceration of obligor
 - [7] Needs of the child
 - [8] Station

TEXTS & TREATISES:

You can click on the links provided to see which law libraries own the title you are interested in, or visit our [catalog](#) directly to search for more treatises.

- 8 Arnold H. Rutkin et al., [Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law And Practice with Forms](#) 3d (2010).
 - Chapter 38. Child Support
 - § 38:12. Factors affecting amount of support required
 - § 38:13. Child's need for maintenance**
 - § 38:14. Statutory factors for determining child's need**
 - § 38:17. Parent's ability to provide support**
 - § 38:18. **Statutory factors for determining parents' respective abilities**
 - Chapter 39. Modification of Child-Support Provisions of Judgment
 - § 39:13. Specific grounds for modification of support
 - § 39:14. Factors relating to visitation or custody
 - § 39:15. Circumstances relating to education
 - § 39:16. Remarriage of either parent
 - § 39:17. Death of either parent
 - § 39:17.10. Incarceration or institutionalization
 - § 39:18. Change in financial circumstances of either parent
 - § 39:19. Health of the children
 - § 39:20. Changes in the cost of living
 - § 39:21. Earnings of the child
 - § 39:22. Effect of modification on arrearages; retroactive changes
 - § 39:23. Effect of prior modification
- Louise Truax, Ed., [LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law](#) (2017).
 - Chapter 7. Child Support.
 - Part IV: Considering the Statutory Criteria in Establishing Child Support
 - Part VII: Establishing Permanent Child Support Orders
- Barbara Kahn Stark, [Friendly Divorce Guidebook for Connecticut: Planning, Negotiating and Filing Your Divorce](#) (2003).
 - Chapter 9. Child Support
 - "If the guidelines do not apply to you," pp. 215-216**

Section 3: Modification of Child Custody

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE: Bibliographic resources relating to the authority, grounds and procedures for modification of court orders relating to custody of minor children.

DEFINITION:

- **Modification:** "means a child custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes or is otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the prior custody determination." Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-115a\(11\)](#) (2017).

STATUTES:

You can visit your local law library or search the most recent [statutes](#) and [public acts](#) on the Connecticut General Assembly website to confirm that you are using the most up-to-date statutes.

- Conn. Gen. Stat. (2017).
 - [Chapter 815j](#). Dissolution of Marriage, Legal Separation and Annulment
 - § [46b-56](#). Orders re custody, care, education, visitation and support of children. Best interests of the child. Access to records of minor child by noncustodial parent. Orders re therapy, counseling and drug or alcohol screening.
 - § [46b-56a](#). Joint custody. Definition. Presumption. Conciliation. Parental responsibility plan. Modification of orders.
 - § [46b-56e](#). Orders of custody or visitation re children of deploying parent.
 - § [46b-71](#). Filing of foreign matrimonial judgment; enforcement in this state.
 - [Chapter 815p](#). Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
 - § [46b-115m](#). Modification of custody determination of another state.
 - [Chapter 816](#) – Support
 - § [46b-224](#). Effect of court order changing or transferring guardianship or custody of child on preexisting support order.

COURT RULES:

Amendments to the Practice Book (Court Rules) are published in the Connecticut Law Journal and posted [online](#).

- Conn. Practice Book (2017).
 - [Chapter 25](#). Superior Court – Procedure in Family Matters
 - § 25-26. Modification of custody, alimony or support
 - § 25-30. Statements to be filed

LEGISLATIVE:

[Office of Legislative Research](#) reports summarize and analyze the law in

- Susan Price-Livingston, *Child Custody Questions*, Connecticut General Assembly. Office of Legislative Research Report, [2002-R-0146](#) (February 14, 2002).

PAMPHLETS:

- Connecticut Network for Legal Aid, [How to Change Your Custody or Visitation Order](#).

COURT FORMS:

Official Judicial Branch forms are frequently updated. Please visit the [Official Court Webforms page](#) for the current forms.

- [Filing a Motion for Modification](#)
- [Filing a Motion for Contempt](#)
- [JD-FM-174](#). Motion For Modification
- [JD-FM-222](#). Application for Emergency Ex Parte Order of Custody

FORMS:

- 8 Arnold H. Rutkin et al. [Connecticut Practice Series. Family Law And Practice with Forms](#), 3rd ed. (2010).
 - Chapter 44. Modification of Custody and Visitation Orders
 - o § 44: 3. Motion for modification of custody/visitation—Form
 - o § 44: 9. Motion for temporary change of custody—Form
- Mary Ellen Wynn & Ellen B. Lubell, [Handbook of Forms for the Connecticut Family Lawyer](#) (1991).
 - o Form VI-C-5. Motion for temporary change of custody pending final determination of motion to modify custody, p. 111

CASES:

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

- [Lugo v. Lugo](#), 176 Conn. App. 149, 154–55 (2017). “In the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the court erred in granting the plaintiff sole legal custody. Significant case law supports the plaintiff’s position on appeal. In *Kidwell v. Calderon*, 98 Conn. App. 754, 911 A.2d 342 (2006), the plaintiff had filed a custody complaint seeking joint legal custody and ‘[a]ny further orders that the [c]ourt in law or equity deems necessary.’ *Id.*, at 755, 911 A.2d 342. The trial court awarded the plaintiff sole custody. The defendant argued to this court that ‘because the plaintiff did not specifically ask for sole custody in his complaint or file a motion seeking sole custody, the court abused its discretion in granting him sole custody.’ *Id.*, at 757, 911 A.2d 342. This court disagreed. Due process requirements of notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard had been satisfied; the defendant had adequate notice. *Id.*, at 758–59, 911 A.2d 342. Although the complaint had not requested the specific relief of sole custody, the requested relief was broadly stated and, in the circumstances of that case, the court properly considered the best interests of the child.”
- [Ward v. Ward](#), Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, No. FA104018922S (August 16, 2016) (2016 Conn. Super. Lexis 2212) (2016 WL 5173364). “The defendant’s motion for modification of custody requests that he be awarded sole legal and primary physical custody of the

children. It also seeks other relief. He alleges that the current custody orders are no longer in the best interests of the children. The court disagrees. The problem does not lie in the terms and conditions of the current court orders that were carefully crafted by a highly skilled guardian ad litem, and agreed upon by the parties five years ago. The current **predicament is due to each party's failure to strictly adhere** to the detailed and well-crafted provisions contained in the parenting plan. The court does not find that a modification of the parenting plan, in the manner suggested by the **defendant, would serve the children's best interests."**

- [Petrov v. Gueorguieva](#), 167 Conn. App. 505, 514-515 (2016). "We note that the requirements for what the court may permissibly decide or order on pleadings involving custody matters historically have been much less circumscribed than in other types of actions . . . Even in the context of child custody proceedings, however, the pleadings play an important role in providing notice as to the claims before the court. See *Strohmeyer v. Strohmeyer*, 183 Conn. 353, 354-56, 439 A.2d 367 (1981) (reversing decision granting parents joint custody without further hearing where mother sought sole custody, father did not contest request for sole custody in pleadings or at trial, and court suggested at trial that it would give sole custody to mother). In exercising its statutory authority to inquire into the best interests of the child, the court cannot sua sponte decide a matter that has not been put in issue, either by the parties **or by the court itself. Rather, it 'must ... exercise that** authority in a manner consistent with the due process requirements of fair notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard. Without a hearing, a trial court may not adjudicate a question of such vital importance to the parties, and one so inherently fact-bound in its resolution. Before a parent is permanently deprived of legal custody, or any change is made therein, the usual and ordinary procedures of a proper **and orderly hearing must be observed.'** Id., at 356, 439 A.2d 367."
- [Daddio v. O'Bara](#), 97 Conn. App. 286, 292-293, 904 A.2d 259, 263 (2006). "To obtain a modification, the moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have changed since the last court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it. Because the establishment of changed circumstances is a condition **precedent to a party's relief, it is pertinent for the trial court** to inquire as to what, if any, new circumstance warrants a modification of the existing order. In making such an inquiry, the trial **court's discretion is essential. The power of the trial** court to modify the existing order does not, however, include the power to retry issues already decided.... Rather, the trial **court's discretion only includes the power to adapt the order** to some distinct and definite change in the circumstances or

conditions of the parties.’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) *Kelly v. Kelly*, 54 Conn. App. 50, 55-56, 732 A.2d 808 (1999); see also *Hall v. Hall*, 186 Conn. 118, 122, 439 A.2d 447 (1982); *Bretherton v. Bretherton*, 72 Conn.App. 528, 543, 805 A.2d 766 (2002).”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

- *Child Custody*
550-662. Modification.
- *Children Out-of-Wedlock*
20.10. Modification.

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

- 24A [Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation](#) (2008).
IV. Child Custody and Support; Visitation Rights
§§ 899-915. Modification of custody or visitation order
- 27C [C.J.S. Divorces](#) (2005).
VII. Custody, Visitation, and Support of Children
§§ 1050-1076. Modification of custody order
- 67A [C.J.S. Parent and Child](#) (2013).
II. Rights and Duties Incident to Relationship
§§ 141-145. Modification or change of custody order

TEXTS & TREATISES:

You can click on the links provided to see which law libraries own the title you are interested in, or visit our [catalog](#) directly to search for more treatises.

- 4 Sandra Morgan Little, [Child Custody & Visitation Law and Practice](#) (2016).
Chapter 25. Modification and Enforcement of Forum
State’s Custody-Visitation Directives
§ 25.02. Modification proceedings: Procedural issues
§ 25.03. Modification standards
§ 25.04. Key modification factors
- 8 Arnold H. Rutkin et al. [Connecticut Practice Series. Family Law and Practice with Forms](#) 3rd ed., (2010).
Chapter 44. Modification of Custody and Visitation Orders
§ 44:2. Procedure for seeking modification
§ 44:4. Standards for modification
§ 44:5. Time of events and circumstances to be considered
§ 44:6. Parties entitled to seek modification
§ 44:7. Pleading specific facts justifying modification
§ 44:10. Particular reason for modifying order
§ 44:22. Automatic modification provisions
- 3 Arnold H. Rutkin, [Family Law and Practice](#) (2016).
Chapter 32. Child Custody and Visitation

§ 32.10. Modification
[1] Generally
[2] Jurisdiction
[3] Time for modification
[4] Procedure
[5] Modification standards
[6] Reasons for modification

- 1 Ann M. Haralambie, [Handling Child Custody, Abuse and Adoption Cases](#) (2009).
Chapter 7. Postdecree Modification of Custody
§ 7:1. Jurisdiction
§ 7:2. Grounds for modification generally
§ 7:5. Time limits for modification
§ 7:18. Modification of custody agreements
§ 7:19. Modification of joint physical custody
§ 7:20. Modification to or from joint legal custody
- 1 Donald T. Kramer, [Legal Rights of Children](#) (rev. 2d ed. 2005).
Chapter 2. Child Custody
§ 2:26. Modification of custody
- Louise Truax, Ed., [LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law](#) (2017).
Chapter 8. Custody and Visitation
§ 8.40 Finding a material change in circumstances for custody determinations
§ 8.41. Seeking a modification
§ 8.43. Restricting the ability of a parent filing a motion for modification

Section 4: Modification of Child Visitation

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE: Bibliographic resources relating to the grounds and procedures for modification of child visitation orders.

DEFINITIONS:

- **Modification:** "In making or modifying any order as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests." Conn. Gen. Stats. [§ 46b-56\(b\)](#) (2017).
- "...[T]here is an important distinction to be drawn between motions to modify custody, which generally require a material change in circumstances; see *Clougherty v. Clougherty*, supra, 162 Conn. App. at 868, 133 A.3d 886; and **motions to modify visitation alone, which do not require a material change.** *Balaska v. Balaska*, 130 Conn.App. 510, 515-16, 25 A.3d 680 (2011); *Szczerkowski v. Karmelowicz*, 60 Conn. App. 429, 433, 759 A.2d 1050 (2000)." [Petrov v. Gueorguieva](#), 167 Conn. App. 505, 522 n16, 146 A.3d 26, 38 (2016). (emphasis added)
- **Best Interests of the Child:** "In ruling on a motion to modify visitation, the court is not required to find as a threshold matter that a change in circumstances has occurred. *Szczerkowski v. Karmelowicz*, 60 Conn.App. 429, 433, 759 A.2d 1050 (2000); see also *McGinty v. McGinty*, 66 Conn.App. 35, 40, 783 A.2d 1170 (2001). Instead, "[i]n modifying an order concerning visitation, the trial court shall "be guided by the best interests of the child...." General Statutes § 46b-56 (b)." *Kelly v. Kelly*, 54 Conn. App. 50, 57, 732 A.2d 808 (1999);" [Balaska v. Balaska](#), 130 Conn. App. 510, 515-16, 25 A.3d 680, 684 (2011).

STATUTES:

You can visit your local law library or search the most recent [statutes](#) and [public acts](#) on the Connecticut General Assembly website.

Conn. Gen. Stat. (2017)

§ [46b-56](#). Orders re custody, care, education, visitation and support of children. Best interests of the child. Access to records of minor child by noncustodial parent. Orders re therapy, counseling and drug or alcohol screening.

§ [46b-59](#). Petition for right of visitation with minor child. Order for payment of fees.

§ [46b-59a](#). Mediation of disputes re enforcement of visitation rights

§ [46b-61](#). Orders re children where parents live separately. Commencement of proceedings

§ [46b-71](#). Filing of foreign matrimonial judgment; enforcement in this state

§ [46b-115m](#). Modification of custody determination of another state.

§ [46b-115w](#). Registration of child custody determination

COURT RULES:

Amendments to the Practice Book (Court Rules) are published in the Connecticut Law Journal and posted [online](#).

Connecticut Practice Book (2017)

§ [25-26](#). Modification of Custody, Alimony or Support

§ [25-30](#). Statements to be filed

OLR REPORTS:

[Office of Legislative Research](#) reports summarize and analyze the law in effect on the date of each report's publication.

- Saul Spigel, [Modifying Visitation Orders After Divorce](#), Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research, Report No. 2001-R-0250 (February 23, 2001). "You wanted to know what existing state laws could prevent a father who had sexually abused another child from having unsupervised visits with his daughter following a divorce."

COURT FORMS:

Official Judicial Branch forms are frequently updated. Please visit the [Official Court Webforms page](#) for the current forms.

- [Official Family Forms](#) (Connecticut Judicial Branch)

- See also: [Filing a Motion for Modification](#)

Unofficial Forms

- [Ruggiero v. Ruggiero](#), 76 Conn. App. 338 (2003), Connecticut Appellate Court Records & Briefs, January 2003.
Ex Parte Motion for Modification of Visitation and Custody (p.28)
- 8 Arnold H. Rutkin et al., [Connecticut Practice: Family Law and Practice with Forms](#) (2010).
§ 44.3. Motion for modification of custody/visitation--
Form
- Mary Ellen Wynn & Ellen B. Lubell, [Handbook of Forms for the Connecticut Family Lawyer](#) (1991)
XVI-b-2. Motion to Fix Visitation, p. 245
- [Martowska v. White](#), 149 Conn. App. 314, n12, 87 A.3d 1201, 1206 (2014). "Alternatively, even if the plaintiff had filed a timely appeal, he is not entitled to relief because he is unable to show harm from the defendant's failure to request leave to seek modification of the existing visitation orders. Relief is only granted 'if one or more of [the court's] rulings were harmful ... [meaning] the ruling would likely affect the result.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *Borkowski v. Borkowski*, 228 Conn. 729, 747, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994). Practice Book § 25-26(g) requires the moving party to request leave to file a motion to modify and 'demonstrate probable cause that grounds exist for the motion to be granted.'"

CASES:

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

- [Balaska v. Balaska](#), 130 Conn. App. 510, 515–16, 25 A.3d 680, 684 (2011). “In ruling on a motion to modify visitation, the court is not required to find as a threshold matter that a change in circumstances has occurred. *Szczerkowski v. Karmelowicz*, 60 Conn. App. 429, 433, 759 A.2d 1050 (2000); see also *McGinty v. McGinty*, 66 Conn. App. 35, 40, 783 A.2d 1170 (2001). Instead, ‘[i]n modifying an order concerning visitation, the trial court shall “be guided by the best interests of the child....’ General Statutes § 46b–56 (b).” *Kelly v. Kelly*, 54 Conn. App. 50, 57, 732 A.2d 808 (1999); see *Szczerkowski v. Karmelowicz*, supra, at 432, 759 A.2d 1050 (‘[w]hen a court rules on a motion to modify visitation, it is statutorily incumbent on the court that its order be guided by the best interest of the child standard’). Accordingly, the court’s alleged failure to find a substantial change in circumstances did not render its order modifying visitation improper.”
- [McGinty v. McGinty](#), 66 Conn. App. 35, 40, 783 A.2d 1170 (2001). “In *Szczerkowski*, as here, the defendant claimed that the court abused its discretion by modifying a visitation order without finding that there was a substantial change in circumstances... We concluded that when considering motions to modify visitation, the court’s should apply the best interest of the child standard.”
- [Szczerkowski v. Karmelowicz](#), 60 Conn. App. 429, 433, 759 A.2d 1050 (2000). “The defendant cites no case, and our independent research discloses none, that requires a court ruling on a motion to modify visitation to find as a threshold matter that a change of circumstances has occurred. Rather, the standard the court applies is that of the best interest of the child.”
- [Kioukis v. Kioukis](#), 185 Conn. 249, 440 A.2d 894 (1981). At the time of the action to modify visitation Connecticut was not the “home state” of the child and therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant a modification.

Support payments are independent of visitation rights.

- [Baumert v. Baumert](#), Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, No. FA96-0152534-S (Jan. 28, 1997) (19 Conn. L. Rptr. 59) (1997 WL 66500) (1997 Conn. Super. Lexis 268). The court concluded that Texas should have jurisdiction to hear a motion to modify visitation based on the fact that “all visitation took place in Texas” and “Texas would seem to possess the greater information as to the child’s best interests”.
- [Pfister v. Pfister](#), Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, No. FA890263992S (June 10, 1997) (1997 WL 334903) (1997 Conn. Super. Lexis 1578). “The children would benefit emotionally by increasing the father’s visitation to allow their relationship to grow in a loving and positive manner. Section 46b-56(a).”

- Serrel v. Serrel, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, No. FA94-0138147-S (December 17, 1996) (1996 WL 745868) (1996 Conn. Super. Lexis 3373). **“It is found to be in the best interests of the older child that visitation with her father be suspended. It is found to be in the best interests of the younger child that overnight visitation be suspended until suitable home or home-like quarters are obtained by the defendant and the court finds such to be the case in a future hearing.”**

TREATISES:

You can click on the links provided to see which law libraries own the title you are interested in, or visit our [catalog](#) directly to search for more treatises.

- 8 Arnold H. Rutkin et al., [Connecticut Practice: Family Law and Practice with Forms](#) (2010).
 - Chapter 44. Modification of custody and visitation orders
 - §44.1. In general
 - §44.2. Procedure for seeking modification
 - §44.3. Motion for modification of custody/visitation—Form
 - §44.4. Standards for modification
 - §44.5. Time of events and circumstances to be considered
 - §44.6. Parties entitled to seek modification
 - §44.7. Pleading specific facts justifying modification
 - §44.8. Temporary or interim orders
 - §44.9. Motion for temporary change of custody—Form
 - §44.10. Particular reasons for modifying orders
 - §44.11. Relocation of the child’s residence**
 - §44.12. Violation of visitation rights
 - §44.13. Needs of the child
 - §44.14. Fitness of parent
 - §44.15. Health of parent
 - §44.16. Remarriage or cohabitation of parent
 - §44.17. Default in support
 - §44.18. Preference of the child
 - §44.19. Death of custodial parent
 - §44.20. Burden of proof
 - §44.21. Effect of agreement for change in custody or visitation
 - §44.22. Automatic modification provisions
 - §44.23. Effects of prior modification
- Louise Truax, Editor, [LexisNexis Practice Guide Connecticut Family Law](#), (2017 edition).
 - Chapter 8. Custody and Visitation
 - Part V. Assessing Considerations in Custody and Visitation Actions
 - § 8.26 Filing Custody and Visitation Motions ***Pendente Lite***—General Considerations
 - § 8.27 Filing a Motion for Custody and

Visitation *Pendente Lite*
§ 8.31 Modifying *Pendente Lite* Orders
Part VI. Filing Custody or Visitation Actions Post
Judgment
§ 8.39 Filing Custody or Visitation Actions
Post Judgment--In General
§ 8.41 Seeking a Modification

- 4 Sandra Morgan Little, [Child Custody & Visitation Law and Practice](#) (2016 edition).
Chapter 25. Modification and enforcement of forum
state's custody-visitation directives
§ 25.01. Preliminary considerations
§ 25.02. Modification proceedings: Procedural
issues
§ 25.03. Modification standards
§ 25.04. Key modification factors
§ 25.05. Enforcement proceedings

Table 2: Request for Leave may be appended to Motion to Modify

Request for Leave JD-FM-202 Rev. 8-07	
Conn. Practice Book § 25-26 (2017)	<p>(g) Upon or after entry of judgment of a dissolution of marriage, dissolution of civil union, legal separation or annulment, or upon or after entry of a judgment or final order of custody and/or visitation for a petition or petitions filed pursuant to Section 25-3 and/or Section 25-4, the judicial authority may order that any further motion for modification of a final custody or visitation order shall be appended with a request for leave to file such motion and shall conform to the requirements of subsection (e) of this section. The specific factual and legal basis for the claimed modification shall be sworn to by the moving party or other person having personal knowledge of the facts recited therein. If no objection to the request has been filed by any party within ten days of the date of service of such request on the other party, the request for leave may be determined by the judicial authority with or without hearing. If an objection is filed, the request shall be placed on the next short calendar, unless the judicial authority otherwise directs. At such hearing, the moving party must demonstrate probable cause that grounds exist for the motion to be granted. If the judicial authority grants the request for leave, at any time during the pendency of such a motion to modify, the judicial authority may determine whether discovery or a study or evaluation pursuant to Section 25-60 shall be permitted. [emphasis added]</p> <p>(Adopted June 29, 2007; Effective October 1, 2007.)</p>
History	<p>HISTORY—2008: Prior to 2008, the first sentence of subsection (g) read: “Any motion for modification of a final custody or visitation order or a parental responsibility plan shall be appended to a request for leave to file such motion and shall conform to the requirements of subsection (e) of this section.”</p>
Official Commentary	<p>COMMENTARY—2008: The above change establishes that the procedure outlined in subsection (g) is no longer required in every case. Upon or after the entry of judgment of a dissolution of marriage, dissolution of civil union, legal or final order of custody and/or visitation for a petition or petitions filed pursuant to Section 25-3 and/or Section 25-4, the judicial authority may order that a party seeking to modify a final custody or visitation order must file a request for leave to do so accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the factual and legal basis for the modifications. [emphasis added]</p>